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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
appeal: 
1. Does the Supreme Court have subject-matter 
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff-Appellant's Appeal? 
2. Did the District Court err in granting the Defendants-
Respondents' Motion For Summary Judgment? (Raised by 
Appellant). 
3. Did the District Court err in failing to apply a 
standard of substantial compliance with respect to the relevant 
statute regarding the execution of testamentary documents? 
(Raised by Appellant). 
4. Did the District Court err in granting Defendants-
Respondents' Motion For Attorneys' Fees? (Raised by Appellant), 
5. Did the District Court err in failing to make specific 
findings of fact with regard to the Defendants-Respondents' 
Motion For Attorneys' Fees on the basis of alleged bad faith 
conduct or other conduct violating Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? (Raised by Appellant), 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents accept and incorporate herein Appellant's 
"Statement of the Case," Appellant's Brief pp. 1-2, except to 
add that the reason Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was never 
heard is indirectly relevant to the award of attorneys fees to 
defendants. Appellant - Plaintiff Wendell Taylor is hereafter 
referred to as "Wendell." 
A, Facts. 
Respondents-defendants, only for the purpose of their 
Motion for Summary Judgment, assumed the truth of the following 
facts, as set forth in Wendell's complaint, Wendell's 
Affidavit, and the depositions of Noel and Geraldine Taylor. 
For the purpose of this appeal, the truth of the following 
facts — although some are disputed by respondents — is assumed. 
1. Grant R. Taylor, deceased, purportedly executed a 
"Will and/or Codicile" on June 30, 1984. (Wendell's Complaint, 
pargraph 5, R. 3.) The instrument was allegedly witnessed by 
Noel Taylor and Geraldine Taylor. (Id., R. 3. A copy of the 
will attached by Wendell to his Complaint is appended to this 
Brief as Exhibit "A"). 
- 3 -
2. Noel Taylor states that he signed the alleged June 30, 
1984 Will on June 30, 1984, in Grant Taylor's presence. (Noel 
Taylor deposition, R. 313, p.6). 
3. Geraldine Taylor, however, swears that she did not 
sign the alleged June 30, 1984 Will until May of 1985, 
approximately eight months after Grant's death. (Geraldine 
Taylor deposition, R. 312, p.7). 
4. Grant R. Taylor prepared a "Last Will and Testament" 
on or about August 30, 1984, properly witnessed in Grant 
Taylor's presence by Jan Johnson and John Stevens. (Wendell 
Taylor's Complaint, paragraph 8, R. 4; Esther Taylor Affidavit, 
paragraph 7, R. 39, 77-86). 
5. Grant R. Taylor created prior to his death a revocable 
trust, entitled the Grant R. Taylor Trust, with Grant Taylor as 
trustee. (Wendell Taylor's Complaint, paragraph 8, R. 4; 
Esther Taylor Affidavit, paragraph 5, R. 38-9, 41-76). 
6. Beneficiaries of the Grant R. Taylor Trust, both 
before and after its amendment on September 21, 1984, were 
Grant Taylor and Grant Taylor's children: Darlene T. Jenkins; 
Darron G., Taylor; and Mark R. Taylor. (Esther Taylor 
Affidavit, paragraph 6, R. 39, 41-76). 
7. Grant R. Taylor married Esther H. Taylor on September 
11, 1940,. After over 40 years of marriage Grant and Esther 
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divorced in 1983. Grant and Esther re-married on September 21, 
1984. (Wendell Taylor's Complaint, paragraph 8, R. 4; Esther 
Taylor Affidavit, paragraph 3, R. 38). 
8. Grant R. Taylor died on September 26, 1984 at the age 
of 61 years. (Esther Taylor Affidavit, paragraph 4, R. 38). 
9. The estate of Grant R. Taylor was informally probated, 
and the assets of his estate have been allocated and 
distributed accordingly. (Esther Taylor Affidavit, 
paragraph 7, R.39). 
10. Noel conveyed to Wendell the original of the alleged 
June 30, 1984 Will some time in or about February, 1985. At 
that time, the document had on it the signature of only one 
witness, that of Noel Taylor. (Noel Taylor deposition, R. 313, 
pp. 6-7, 11-12). A copy of this version of the alleged June 
30, 1984 will is appended to this Brief as Exhibit "B." 
11. Geraldine signed the alleged June 30, 1984 will in 
May, 1985, approximately 8 months after Grant Taylor's death. 
(Geraldine Taylor deposition, R. 312, p. 7; Noel Taylor 
deposition, R. 313, p. 6). Geraldine signed as an attesting 
witness at Noel's request and in Wendell's presence. (Noel 
Taylor deposition, R. 313, pp. 6, 7, 11-12). 
12. Wendell Taylor has admitted that he attended the 
depositions of Geraldine and Noel Taylor on November 20, 1985 
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and that as to the conveyance of the document from Noel to 
Wendell, and as to the subsequent signing by Geraldine, that 
their testimony was accurate, (Plaintiff's Responses to 
Admissions and Interrogatories, R. 197-199, Responses Nos. 1 
and 3) . 
B. Procedural History of Case. 
The procedural history of the case is relevant to at least 
two of the issues on appeal: (1) Was the award of attorneys 
fees to defendants proper? and (2) Does this court have 
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal (because of 
Wendell's failure to timely file notice of appeal)?: 
1. Wendell filed this action in October, 1985. In his 
complaint, Wendell alleged that a will executed by his brother 
Grant on August 30, 1984 was invalid and prayed that the assets 
of Grant's estate be redistributed according to the terms of a 
newly discovered will, allegedly executed by Grant on June 30, 
1984. (Complaint, R. 2-7). 
2. Attached to Wendell's complaint, and by reference 
incorporated therein, was a copy of the alleged June 30, 1984 
will (R. 6; see Exhibit "AM attached hereto). On that copy was 
the signature of one, and only one, witness; that of Wendell's 
other brother, Noel Taylor. 
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3. In response to Wendell's complaint, defendants on 
October 16, 1985 filed with the court and served on Wendell's 
counsel a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice and a Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion. 
(R. 8-10). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was premised on the 
argument that Wendell was not entitled to relief as a matter of 
law since the alleged June 30, 1984 will was witnessed by only 
one person. (Defendant's Memorandum, R. 11-20). 
4. Defendants noticed up their Motion for Hearing on 
October 29, 1985 before Judge Raymond Uno. (R. 31-2). 
5. Wendell sought and obtained an ex parte Order from the 
Court continuing the Hearing date until November 14, 1985. 
6. On November 12, 1985, two days prior to the continued 
hearing date, Wendell's attorney contacted defendants' 
attorneys by phone and informed them that Wendell would be 
filing an Affidavit. Also on November 12, 1985, Wendell served 
on defendants' counsel the Affidavit of Wendell E. Taylor in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice. 
(R. 99-110) . 
7. In his November 12 Affidavit, Wendell denied that the 
copy of the June 30, 1984 will appended to the original 
complaint was "a true and accurate copy" of an original that he 
had in his possession. (R. 99-100). Appended to Wendell's 
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Affidavit was another copy of the alleged June 30, 1984 will. 
(R. 104, see Exhibit B appended hereto). The copy appended to 
Wendell's Affidavit differed from the copy appended to the 
original complaint in that the newly-supplied copy contained a 
third signature, that of Geraldine Taylor. (R.6, 104; Exhibit 
A and B appended hereto). 
8c In light of Wendell's Affidavit, counsel for both 
Wendell and defendants agreed to continue indefinitely the 
Hearing date on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pending an 
opportunity for defendants' counsel to depose the two alleged 
witnesses to the alleged June 30, 1984 will. (R. 88-89). 
9. On November 19, 1985, defendants' attorneys deposed 
Noel and Geraldine Taylor. During Geraldine's deposition, she 
confessed that she did not sign the alleged June 30, 1984 will 
of Grant Taylor until eight months after Grant's death (R. 312, 
p.7), and that she then signed at Noel's request. (R. 312, 
P . 8) . 
10. On January 22, 1986, defendants filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment and for Attorneys Fees with the Court. 
(R. 200-202, 132-134). Supporting memoranda were also filed. 
(R. 135-199, 117-131) . 
11. Wendell filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, though no copy of the 
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Memorandum appears in the Record. A copy is therefore attached 
to this Memo as Exhibit C. The Memorandum was served on 
defendants less than 24 hours prior to the hearing. Wendell 
filed no Memorandum in Opposition to defendant's Motion for 
Attorneys Fees. 
12. On February 20, 1986, the Court heard defendants' 
Motions. Both defendants and Wendell were represented by 
counsel and counsel for each presented oral argument. The 
Court granted both of defendants' Motions, but held 
determination of the amount of attorneys fees in abeyance 
pending submission of an affidavit detailing defendants' 
attorneys fees to the Court. (R. 212). No transcript was made 
of the hearing. During the hearing, however, the Judge stated, 
relative to the issue of attorneys fees, that he did not find 
bad faith on the part of plaintiff. Nevertheless, he ruled 
that attorneys fees were warranted under the circumstances. 
13. On March 3, 1986, defendants filed with the Court an 
Affidavit in Support of Award of Attorneys Fees. (R. 213-227). 
14. Also on March 3, 1986, defendants submitted to the 
Court a proposed Order Granting Defendants* Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Dismissing Action with Prejudice and Awarding 
Defendants Attorneys Fees. (R. 234-237). Defendants, in 
compliance with Third District Rule of Practice 4(b), served by 
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hand delivery a copy of the proposed order on Wendell's 
attorney the same day. (R. 237). 
15. On March 14, 1986, eleven days after being served with 
the proposed order, Wendell filed with the Court and served on 
defendants an Objection to defendants' proposed Order. 
(R. 231-233). 
16. On March 14, 1986, defendants filed with the Court and 
served on Wendell their Response to his Objection. 
(R. 228-230). 
17. Wendell did not notice up a hearing on his Objection 
to defendants' proposed Order. 
18. On March 24, 1986, the Court signed defendants' Order 
as submitted and determined that defendants were entitled to 
$5,000 in attorneys fees. Judgment was entered and filed with 
the Court that same day. (R. 235-237; a copy of the Judgment 
signed and entered on March 24, 1986 is appended hereto as 
Exhibit D). 
19. On June 10, 1986, defendants served a Writ of 
Garnishment on Continental Bank & Trust, which responded that 
it had funds owed to Wendell in its possession. (R. 243-7). 
20. On June 10 or 11, 1986, Continental Bank in response 
to the Writ of Garnishment, notified Wendell by mail and by 
telephone that his account had been garnished. (Deposition of 
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Continental Bank officer Jeanne Campbell, R. 311, pp. 7-8). In 
a phone conversation with Ms. Campbell, Wendell specifically 
asked the identity of the party or parties who had served 
;; Writ. In response, Ms. Campbell identified the action and 
named the defendants listed on the Writ of Garnishment. (Id. 
|j pp. 8-10) . 
n 21. On July 1, 1986, defendants filed with the Court and 
*; served on Wendell, by mail, a formal notice of the Order 
: Granting Summary Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees. 
• (R. 254-9). 
;! 22. On July 29, 1986, Wendell filed a Substitution of 
j; Counsel; A. Howard Lundgren substituting for Stanley S. Adams. 
;; (R. 266) . 
?{ 
\\ 23. On July 29, 1986, Wendell's new attorney Lundgren 
|; appeared before the Court on an ex parte basis and moved the 
\\ Court for an Order extending the time for filing a Notice of 
-Appeal. The Motion was predicated on the representation that 
•i Wendell did not receive formal Notice of the Order Granting 
S Judgment until July 3, 1986. Wendell's attorney reguested 30 
; days from July 3, plus an additional 30 days, in which to 
prepare and file a Notice of Appeal. Wendell's attorney, 
according to the Motion, reguested the additional 30 days 
because he would be out of town between July 30 and August 15. 
[\ (R. 267-8) . 
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24. On July 29, 1986, the Court entered an Order Extending 
Time for Filing Notice of Appeal, extending the time for filing 
notice "from August 3, 1986 to September 3, 1986." (R. 276). 
25. On August 12, 1986, defendants filed with the Court 
and served on Wendell an Objection to the Order Extending Time 
for Filing Notice of Appeal. (R. 285-7). 
26. On September 3, 1986 Wendell filed with the Court and 
served on defendants a Notice of Appeal. (R. 292-3). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
56, is appropriate only where the favored party makes a showing 
which precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief 
to the losing party. Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop., 
11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 (1961). Defendants argued to the 
District Court that even if the allegations set forth in 
Wendell's original complaint, as modified in his November 16, 
1985 Affidavit, were true, that Wendell was entitled to no 
relief as a matter of law. The Court agreed and granted 
defendants' motion. 
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The standard of review applicable to summary judgments 
requires that this Court view the record in a light most 
favorable to Wendell, the losing party below. Hoeppner v. Utah 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co,, 595 P.2d 863, 864 (Utah 1979). Again, 
even if Wendell's allegations—which Respondents dispute—are 
taken as true, Wendell is precluded as a matter of law from 
obtaining the relief he sought in the Court below. 
! Respondents have discovered no Utah cases that dictate the 
standard of review accorded an award of attorneys fees by a 
Judge under a Rule 11 or similar context. Respondents urge 
; that the standard to be employed in such situations should 
presume that the award was well-founded and that the award 
] should be affirmed unless the record indicates that the Judge 
abused his discretion. See e,g., Basch v. Westinghouse 
* Electric Corp., 777 F.2d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 1985, cert. denied, 
106 S.Ct. 1957, (District judge's award of sanctions upheld 
where appellate court on review of record could find no abuse 
of discretion). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because 
Appellant failed to timely file a Notice of Appeal. 
A. Appellant's Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 
days of entry of judgment. 
B. Failure to give formal notice under Rule 58A(d) does 
not extend the time for filing Notice of Appeal. 
C. Appellant's Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 
days of Appellant's receipt of actual notice of entry of 
judgment. Rule 58A(d)'s purpose was satisfied by Appellant's 
receipt of actual notice. 
D. If Entry of Judgment is deemed to be the date on which 
Appellant: received formal notice under Rule 58A(d), the 
extension of time granted Appellant in which he could file a 
Notice of Appeal exceeded the Court's discretion. 
E. Appellant's Notice of Appeal filed on Sept. 3, 1986, 
163 days after entry of judgment, was not timely filed. This 
Court consequently lacks jurisdiction to hear his appeal. 
II. The purported June 30, 1984 will is invalid as a matter of 
law because it was not properly executed. 
- 14 -
A. the will was not properly executed because it was not 
signed by the two witnesses in the testator's presence. 
B. The fact that the Legislature added the last sentence of 
Section 75-2-502 when it adopted the Uniform Probate Code 
indicates a legislative intent that the provision be enforced. 
C. The doctrine of substantial compliance, even if 
embraced by this Court, does not excise the last sentence of 
Section 75-2-502. 
D. The language of the last sentence of Section 75-2-502 is 
mandatory in nature; the Legislature intended the sentence to 
be so interpreted. 
E. The doctrine of substantial compliance, when properly 
understood, is not satisfied in this case in any event. 
III. If the alleged June 30, 1984 will is invalid as a 
matter of law, Appellant lacks standing to challenge Grant 
Taylor's August 30, 1984 will because he is not an "interested 
person" under Section 75-3-401(1). 
IV. The District Court's award of attorneys fees to defendants 
was proper. 
A. The will attached to the plaintiff's complaint was 
signed by only one witness. 
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B. Plaintiff, almost a month and a half later, and a 
month after defendants pointed out to plaintiff pursuant to a 
Motion to Dismiss that a will signed by one witness is invalid, 
informed defendants that the will appended to the complaint was 
not a "true and accurate copy"; that plaintiff would produce a 
"true and accurate" copy signed by two witnesses. 
C. As a direct consequence of plaintiff's "error," and of 
plaintiff permitting that "error" to fester for over a month 
and a half without correcting it, defendants incurred 
substantial attorneys fees that they otherwise would not have 
incurred. 
D. The Court's award of attorneys fees under the 
circumstances was warranted under the inherent powers of the 
court or, alternatively, under Rule 11 if Rule 11 was in effect 
prior to the filing of the complaint. 
E. Findings of Fact with respect to attorneys fees 
awarded as sanctions are not required, according to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). 
F. Ample evidence was provided the Court to support its 
award of attorneys fees to defendants. 
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LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear this Appeal because 
Appellant Failed to Timely File a Notice of Appeal, 
The Third District Court, Judge Uno presiding, entered 
judgment in favor of defendants on March 24, 1986. Wendell's 
Notice of Appeal, filed September 3, 1986, was filed 163 days 
after entry of judgment and <at_ least 84 days after he received 
actual notice of the Court's entry of judgment. 
Wendell appeared before the District Court on July 29, 1986 
(127 days after judgment was signed and filed) and, in an ex 
parte hearing, persuaded the Court to extend the time until 
September 3 in which he could file a Notice of Appeal. 
Wendell's motion was premised on the fact that his counsel did 
not receive notice of the Court's Entry of Judgment until July 
3, 1986. Wendell requested 30 days following July 3 in which 
to file a Notice of Appeal, plus another 30 days because his 
attorney was leaving town on vacation. Wendell filed his 
Notice of Appeal on September 3, 1986. 
A. Appellant's Notice of Appeal was Not Filed within 30 
Days of Entry of Judgment, as Required by Appellate 
Procedure Rule 4(a). 
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A losing party may appeal an adverse judgment in a civil 
action as a matter of right, Utah R. App. P. 3(a). An appeal 
is initiated by filing with the District Court a "Notice of 
Appeal," which must be filed "within 30 days after the date of 
the entry of judgment . . . appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 
4(a). "Entry of Judgment" occurs when the Judgment is signed 
by the Judge and filed by the clerk of the court. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 58A(c). 
The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of 
defendants, dismissing Wendell's complaint with prejudice, on 
March 24, 1986. The 30 day period for filing a notice of 
appeal expired on April 23. Wendell didn't request an 
extension of the time in which to file a Notice of an Appeal 
until July 29. The Notice of Appeal itself was not filed until 
September 3. 
Wendell's Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 days 
after Entry of Judgment. Consequently, it was not filed in 
time, pursuant to Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a). 
B. Even if "Entry of Judgment" is Deemed not to Occur 
until the Losing Party Receives Notice of the Entry of 
Judgment, Appellant still did not File a Notice of 
Appeal within 30 days Following Actual Notice of Entry 
of Judgment. 
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Appellant contends that the 30 day period referred to 
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a) does not begin to run until the 
losing party receives notice of the entry of judgment under 
Civil Procedure Rule 58A(d). Appellant's Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Opposition to the Respondents' Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction and Motion to Strike, 
p. 7. 
The purpose of the new Rule 58A(d)l is to ensure that 
non-prevailing parties are informed of entry of judgment 
against them, so that they may act on such knowledge and decide 
whether to file a Notice of Appeal within the time prescribed 
by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Advisory Committee Note 
to Rule 58A(d), Utah Bar Letter, January, 1986, p. 5. 
In this instance, Wendell was informed and received notice 
of the judgment against him by no later than June 11, 1986. On 
June 10, defendants served a Writ of Garnishment on Continental 
Bank; return of service on which was filed with the Court. 
1
 Rule 58A(d) was promulgated by the Supreme Court effective 
December 1, 1985, according to the Utah Bar Letter, January, 
1986, p. 5. The new rule was included in the paperback, 
blue-cover Utah Court Rules Annotated (1986 ed.), published by 
the Michie Company. However, the 1986 Supplement to Volume 9B 
of Utah Code Ann., also published by Michie, contained no 
reference to the new rule. 
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Continental Bank, pursuant to its normal operating procedure, 
notified Wendell of the garnishment by mail and by phone. 
!'Wendell, when he talked to officer Jeanne Campbell of 
Continental Bank on the 10th or 11th asked the identity of the 
parties who had served the Writ. R. 311, p. 10. Continental 
; Bank also mailed to Wendell a copy of the Writ, which 
• identified the parties to the action, the civil number of the 
: action, etc. Id. p. 8 and Exhibit 2 thereto. Furthermore, the 
: information passed to Wendell by Continental Bank came to him 
:
 after the Court had granted defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment in open court, with his counsel present and presenting 
argument. See Minute Entry issued by the Court, R. 212. 
Although Wendell had not received formal notice pursuant to 
Rule 58A(d), he was notified and knew of the judgment against 
him by no later than June 11, 1986. Thirty days then passed 
!
 and he filed no notice of appeal. Forty-five days passed. 
Finally, on July 29, at least 48 days after Wendell had 
received actual notice of the judgment against him, he decided 
to swap attorneys and reguest more time in which to file a 
notice of appeal. 
Wendell thus knew by no later than June 11 that his account 
had been garnished and that judgment had been entered against 
him. Service by defendants of the Writ of Garnishment on 
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Continental Bank operated to give Wendell actual notice of the 
judgment entered against him. Actual notice satisfies the 
purpose of Civil Procedure Rule 58A(d) and, thus, Wendell's 
failure to file an appeal within 30 days of his actual 
knowledge of the judgment warrants dismissal of his appeal 
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. Furthermore, one 
having actual notice is not prejudiced by a failure to receive 
statutory notice, and may not complain of the failure to 
receive statutory notice. First National Bank v. Oklahoma 
Savings and Loan Board, 569 P.2d 993, 987 (Okla. 1977). 
This court has not interpreted delayed notice under Rule 
58A(d) to postpone the running of prescribed time period in 
which notice of an appeal must be filed under Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a) and (e).^ Even if that 
interpretation is adopted, however, Wendell received notice -
actual notice - of the judgment entered against him by no later 
2
 The recent amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which became effective Jan. 1, 1987, amended Rule 58A(d), which 
had been in effect only just over a year, by adding, "However, 
the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the 
notice requirement of this provision." Emphasis added. 
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than June 11, 1986. Wendell then permitted in excess of 30 
days to lapse without filing a Notice of Appeal and without 
taking any other action to protect his right of appeal. 
C. Even if the Date of "Entry of Judgment" is Deemed to 
be July 1, 1986, the Extension by the Court on July 29 
of the Time in Which to File a Notice of Appeal 
Exceeded the Court's Discretion Under Appellate 
Procedure Rule 4(e). 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e) provides that the 
initial 30 day period in which a Notice of Appeal may be filed 
may be extended by court order' an additional 30 days, but only 
upon a showing of "excusable neglect" or "good cause." Wendell 
requested such an extension on July 29. Wendell's request for 
an extension, however, was predicated on (1) his selection of 
new counsel and (2) that his counsel would be out of town for 
several days. 
The term "good cause" in Appellate Procedure Rule 4(e) 
refers to "an extraordinary circumstance that prevented movant 
from filing a timely notice of appeal and not to inadvertence 
or oversight on the part of counsel or to the failure of the 
client to authorize an appeal." Utah R. App. P. 4(e), Advisory 
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Committee Note (emphases added). The desire of Wendell's 
counsel to leave town on vacation does not constitute "good 
cause" or "excusable neglect" under Appellate Procedure Rule 
4(e). See e.g. , Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 
676 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah 1984) (citing with approval a Maryland 
:
 case holding that a senior partner's death and resultant delay 
in filing notice of appeal did not establish excusable 
neglect). Plaintiff's choice to hire new counsel toward the 
M end of the 30-day period (assuming the 30 days referred to in 
•] Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a) began to run on July 1) likewise 
does not constitute "excusable neglect" or "good cause." See 
:• e.g., Laugesen v. Witkin Homes, Inc., 479 P.2d 289 (Colo. App. 
I; 1970) . 
]\ A Notice of Appeal, as the 7th Circuit observed, is "an 
;i extremely simple instrument to prepare and file and if it is 
:
;
 subsequently ascertained that an appeal should not be pursued 
:; it can be dismissed." Files v. City of Rockford, 440 F.2d 811, 
; 816 (7th Cir. 1971) (interpreting Fed. R. App. P. 4 and citing 
- 9 Moore's Federal Practice If 204.13[3], at 978 (2d ed. 1970)). 
: Wendell's attorney instead of filing a Motion for Extension of 
Time, could have filed a Notice of Appeal or he could have 
easily filed a Notice of Appeal before he left town. There was 
; no "good cause" for Wendell having an extra 30 days. 
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The District Court exceeded its authority under Appellate 
Procedure Rule 4(e) in granting Wendell an extension on July 29 
based on the grounds presented by Wendell. Where an extension 
is granted by a District Court in the absence of "excusable 
neglect" or "good cause," the filing of a Notice of Appeal 
within the extension period is not timely filed under Appellate 
Procedure Rule 4(e). Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co., supra. 
D. Failure to Timely File Notice of Appeal is 
Jurisdictional, and Requires Dismissal of the Appeal. 
Timely Notice of an Appeal is jurisdictional. Nelson v. 
Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983); Watson v. Anderson, 29 Utah 
2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1972). Since failure to timely file a 
Notice of Appeal is jurisdictional, the Supreme Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal in which Notice of Appeal is not 
timely filed. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 
1982). An appeal, in such circumstances, must be dismissed. 
Ld.; Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Watson v. 
Anderson, supra. 
The Supreme Court may not enlarge the time for filing a 
Notice of Appeal. Utah R. App. P. 22(b); Utah R. App. P. 2, 
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Advisory Committee Note ("Rule 22(b) prohibits the Supreme 
Court from extending or suspending the time for appeal or 
review and the district court is otherwise prohibited except as 
provided by Rule 4(e)"). Emphasis added. 
Defendants did not give formal notice to Wendell of the 
entry of judgment against him until July 1. Wendell, 
accordingly, wants this Court to declare that the 30 day period 
referred to in Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a) did not begin to 
run until July 1, 1986, that his request for an extension of 
time was warranted and timely made on July 29, 1986, and that 
his Notice of Appeal was timely filed on September 3, 1986. 
No Utah decision has interpreted the in-effect for one year 
(and published in only some of the official codes) Rule 58A(d) 
to extend the time period in which a losing party may initiate 
an appeal. The recent amendment to Rule 58A(d) suggests that 
it does not. 
Under any interpretation given to Rule 58A(d), as it 
affects the running of the 30 day period under Appellate Rule 
4(a), Wendell's Notice of Appeal was not timely filed in this 
case. If Entry of Judgment is deemed to be the date the 
Judgment was signed and filed, see Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c), then 
the Judgment was entered on March 24 and neither Wendell's 
request for an extension on July 29 nor his Notice of Appeal on 
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September 3 was timely made. If Entry of Judgment is deemed to 
be the date on which Wendell received actual notice of the 
Judgment, then the Judgment would be deemed entered on either 
June 11 or 12. Again, neither Wendell's request for an 
extension on July 29 nor his Notice of Appeal on September 3 
was timely made. If Entry of Judgment is deemed to be the date 
on which formal notice was mailed to Wendell pursuant to Rule 
58A(d), then the Judgment would be deemed entered on July 1. 
Under that interpretation, Wendell's request for an extension, 
though made within 30 days, was made without "good cause," see 
Utah R. App. P. 4(e), and the Notice of Appeal on September 3 
still was not timely filed. 
Under any of the above interpretations, Appellant failed to 
file his Notice of Appeal within the time prescribed by the 
Rules. This Court consequently lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the Appeal, the Appeal should be 
dismissed, and the summary judgment and award of attorneys fees 
by the district court should be affirmed. 
II. The Purported June 30, 1984 Will is Invalid as a Matter of 
Law because it was not Properly Executed. 
A. The Alleged June 30, 1984 Will was not Executed in 
Compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-502. 
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Wendell's Complaint is founded upon an alleged will, 
allegedly executed by Grant R. Taylor on June 30, 1984. The 
alleged will is purported to be Grant's "Final Will and 
Testament," and is characterized in Wendell's complaint as a 
"Will and/or Codicile." 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-502 (1978), which governs execution 
of wills, provides that: 
Except as provided for holographic wills, 
writings within section 75-2-513, and wills 
within section 75-2-506, every will shall be 
in writing signed by the testator or in the 
testator's name by some other person in the 
testator's presence and by his direction, 
and shall be signed by at least two persons 
each of whom witnessed either the signing or 
the testator's acknowledgment of the 
signature or of the will. The signing by 
the witnesses must be in the testator's 
presence and in the presence of each other. 
[Emphases added.] 
Neither of the versions of the alleged June 30, 1984 will 
produced by Wendell is a holographic will, since each is 
typewritten. Nor does either version fall within the ambit of 
Section 75-2-513 (separate writing identifying bequest of 
tangible property) or Section 75-2-506 (choice of law as to 
execution). 
Section 75-2-502 thus requires that a will, to be valid, 
must be witnessed and signed by at least two persons. 
Furthermore, each of the persons who witnessed the testator's 
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signature must sign in the testator's presence and must sign in 
the presence of each other. This requirement, imposed by the 
last sentence of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-502 (1978), does not 
appear in the Uniform Probate Code, and was expressly retained 
by the Utah Legislature when it adopted a modified version of 
the Uniform Probate Code in 1975. See Wellman and Gordon, 
"Uniformity in State Inheritance Laws: How UPC Article II Has 
Fared in Nine Enactments," 1976 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 357, 381. The 
purpose of such a provision is to guard against fraud. 94 
C.J.S. Wills § 189. " 
"The right to dispose of property by will is governed and 
controlled entirely by statute. Such statutes are mandatory, 
and unless strictly complied with, the instrument, as a will, 
is void." In re Alexander's Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 P.2d 
432, 434 (1943) (emphasis added) (will invalid where testator 
did not sign in the presence of witnesses); In re Love's 
Estate, 75 Utah 342, 285 P. 299, 301 (1930); In re Wolcott's 
Estate, 54 Utah 165, 180 P. 169, 170 (1919); see also In re 
McCoy's Estate, 91 Utah 212, 63 P.2d 620 (1937) (will invalid 
where, although two witnesses signed testator's proposed will, 
they did not sign at her express request). To construe the 
statute governing the execution of wills other than literally, 
is to usurp legislative authority. In re Alexander's Estate, 
supra 139 P.2d at 434. 
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By her own admission, Geraldine Taylor did not sign the 
; alleged June 30, 1984 will until May of 1985, eleven months 
]] later and approximately eight months after Grant's death. 
,; Obviously, Geraldine, the alleged second witness, did not sign 
\] the will "in the testator's presence," as mandated by the 
:] statute. As such, the June 30, 1984 instrument—even that 
\\ version appended to Wendell's November 12, 1985 Affidavit — is 
not a valid will of Grant R. Taylor. 
!; Noel Taylor's alleged signature, by itself, cannot and does 
'] not validate the June 30, 1984 document. Utah Code Ann. 
i; § 75-2-502 (1978). Where signatures by two attesting witnesses 
:': are required by statute, and a purported will is signed by only 
i] one attesting witness, such will is invalid. Id.; McGarvey v. 
\] McGarvey, 405 A.2d 250 (Md. App. 1979); In re Will of Poppe, 
302 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1969); Seab v. Seab, 203 So.2d 
i 478 (Miss. 1967); Cooper v. Liverman, 406 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. 
\\ App. 1966); In re Ritchie's Will, 198 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Prob. 
1962); In re Shattuck's Estate, 37 N.W.2d 555 (Mich. 1949). 
A will that is not properly executed cannot be admitted to 
probate, Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-409, -402, -303(3) (1978); In 
re McCoy's Estate, supra at 628, and the decedent's personal 
representative may not distribute the assets of a decedent's 
estate according to the terms of such an instrument. Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-703(1) (1978). 
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B. The Doctrine of "Substantial Compliance" Does Not 
Excise the Last Sentence of Utah Code Ann, § 75-2-502 
(1978). 
Prior to the adoption by the Utah legislature of the 
Uniform Probate Code in 1985, Utah law required that a properly 
executed will be witnessed by at least two persons and signed 
by those two persons in the presence of the testator. See Utah 
Code Ann,, § 74-1-5 (4) (1953 , 1976 Reprint ed.)( repealed 1975 
effec. 1977). The Uniform Probate Code does not contain such a 
requirement. When Utah adopted its version of the Uniform 
Probate Code in 1975, the legislature specifically added the 
last sentence of Section 75-2-502 and thus retained the 
requirement present in prior Utah law. The fact that the Utah 
legislature expressly retained the requirement set forth in the 
pre-1975 Utah Probate Code, one not present in the Uniform 
Probate Code, indicates a clear legislative intent to retain 
and enforce the requirement that the witnesses to a will sign 
in the presence of the testator. 
The directive set forth in Section 75-2-502 is simple and 
straightforward; a will to be valid "must" be signed by two 
witnesses "in the testator's presence." Words and phrases in 
statutes are to be construed according to their context and the 
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Wendell urges that this Court liberally interpret Section 
75-2-502 and rule that with respect to the alleged June 30, 
1984 Will the requisites set forth in the statute were 
substantially complied with. Appellant's Brief p. 13. 
Wendell first refers to the Editorial Board Comments 
following Section 75-5-502, which note that "the formalities 
for execution of a will have been reduced to a minimum," draws 
attention to the Board's comments that the witnesses need 
witness the testator's signature and implies that that is all 
that is necessary for a will to be valid. Wendell omits that 
the comments are those of the Joint Editorial Board of the 
National Conference of Commissioners on the Uniform Probate 
Code, see "Forward," 8A Utah Code Ann., Title 75 (1978), and 
not those of the Utah legislature. Wendell likewise omits that 
the last sentence of Section 75-2-502, which does not appear in 
the Uniform Probate Code, and on which the Editorial Board 
Comments are based, was expressly retained by the Utah 
legislature when it repealed the former law and adopted Utah's 
version of the Uniform Probate Code. 
Second, Wendell relies on Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102 (1978), 
which states that the probate code "shall be liberally 
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies," and Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1953), which states 
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between the manner in which the will was executed and the 
formalities required by Montana statute: among others, that 
Rudd signed the will at least 15 to 30 minutes before the 
attesting witnesses; that Rudd did not sign the purported will 
in the presence of the attesting witnesses, and that the 
witnesses did not sign in Rudd's presence. Id. at 529. The 
Montana statute — as does Utah's current statute -- required 
that there be two attesting witnesses, that each must sign as 
witnesses, and that each must sign in the testator's presence. 
Id. Under those circumstances, the trial court ruled that the 
requisites of the Montana statute on execution of wills "were 
not substantially complied with." IdL at 531 (emphasis 
added). The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. Ld. at 532. 
Wendell also cites In re Estate of Perkins, 210 Kan. 619, 
504 P.2d 564 (1972) in support of his position. The Perkins 
case, as the section quoted by Wendell indicates, stands only 
for the proposition that "slight or trifling departures from 
technical requirements" should not operate to defeat a will. 
Id. at 568. The abject failure to comply with an express 
requirement of a statute, however, is not a "slight or trifling 
departure." 
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Appei land cited In re Estate of Birkeland • ;• •; :
 : 
Memor ancpr ->t Points and Authorities in Opposition r" o 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff cited 
Birkeland ostensibly for the proposition that "a liberal 
construction" should be jiven to the statute on formalities 
required for execution of wills. Defendant, however, omitted 
the explanation of "substantial compliance" given oy the Court 
and omitted that the Court in Bi rkeland, wnere statutory 
requisites were not complied with, held that the purported 
at issue "was not executed and attested in substantial 
c omp i i ,i n c e w i t h " t h e Mr- n -• a n a u.;i-.u-.:. 
- J:> -
that is expressly mandated by statute and a requirement that 
the Utah legislature clearly intended to have followed. Thus, 
even if a doctrine of "substantial compliance" is embraced by 
this Court, the requisites of Section 75-2-502 were not 
"substantially complied with" under the facts of in this case. 
The June 30, 1984 document is not a valid will, even under a 
"substantial compliance" standard. 
III. Because the Purported June 30, 1984 Will is not a Valid 
Will, Appellant Lacks Standing to Challenge the Validity 
of Grant Taylor's August 30, 1984 Will and/or the Grant R, 
Taylor Trust. 
Unless a contestant is or becomes a beneficiary of a 
decedent's estate by an adjudication that a decedent's will is 
invalid, that contestant lacks legal standing to contest that 
will. In re Estate of Bonfils, 543 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1975). 
Wendell, for example, would not have standing to petition the 
Court to set aside the informal probate of Grant Taylor's 
August 30, 1984 will. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-401(1) (Supp. 
1986) (providing that only an "interested person" may petition 
to set aside a will). 
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to -103 (1978). Even if, as Wendell alleges, Grant's 
remarriage to Esther was conducted at a time when Grant was not 
in control of his faculties and was not of sound mind, Wendell 
would still not take an interest. Even in that extreme 
situation, the property in Grant's estate would descend to his 
children under Id. § 75-2-103; it would not descend to Wendell. 
Wendell insists that he is an "interested person" under 
Section 75-1-201(20) by virtue of the fact that the June 30, 
1984 document evidences a debt owed by him to Grant Taylor; 
that he therefore "has a property right in or claim against the 
estate in the determination of whether the debt to the estate 
is cancelled." Appellant's Brief p. 11. Wendell's statement 
misses the point. Wendell is an "interested person" for the 
purpose of challenging Grant's August 30, 1984 will if, but 
only if, the prior June 30, 1984 document is held to be a valid 
testamentary disposition. In that instance, Wendell would be 
an "interested person" and can challenge the validity of the 
August 30, 1984 will on grounds of undue influence, etc. If, 
however, the alleged June 30, 1984 will is invalid as a matter 
of law, as the district court held, then Wendell is not an 
"interested person" and has no independent standing to 
challenge the August 30, 1984 will. 
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attorneys fees: (1) that the "inexcusable neglect" of 
plaintiff and/or his attorney warranted attorneys fees and/or 
(2) that plaintiff's "bad faith" warranted attorneys fees. 
Defendants' Memorandum, R. 117-131. Wendell presented no 
memorandum in opposition. Although it is not in the record 
since no transcript of the hearing was made, the Judge stated 
orally in ruling on defendants' motion, that he did not think 
plaintiff's conduct involved amounted to "bad faith." 
Nevertheless, the Court found attorneys fees warranted under 
the circumstances and took the matter of fees under advisement 
pending submission of an affidavit by defendants setting forth 
their fees. Minute Entry, R. 212. Defendants' attorney 
subsequently submitted an affidavit detailing defendants' 
fees. Wendell objected to the award of fees and defendants 
responded to his objections. On March 24, 1984, after having 
received Defendants' Memorandum and after having heard oral 
arguments on the issue, after having received Defendants' 
Affidavit, and after having been submitted both Wendell's 
objections and Defendants* response, the Court signed the Order 
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted 
defendants $5,000 in attorney's fees. 
Inasmuch as the Court granted defendants attorneys fees, it 
may be implied from the Judge's comment that he did not find 
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explanation, however, Wendell's and his counsel's failure to 
allege or even notice that the version appended to the 
complaint: was not the "true and accurate" version of the 
alleged June 30, 1984 will constituted at the very least an 
egregious oversight and a violation of counsel's responsibility 
under Rule 11. The damage caused by that oversight was then 
exacerbated by Wendell waiting over a month and a half 
following service of process on defendants, and a full 27 days 
following service of defendants' Motion to Dismiss, to inform 
defendants less than 48 hours prior to the hearing on 
defendants' Motion, of the "oversight. " In the interim, 
defendants' counsel advised defendants of the defect concerning 
the signature, conducted research, prepared a Motion to Dismiss 
and accompanying Memorandum, and twice prepared oral arguments; 
all on the understanding that the document at issue contained 
the signature of only one witness. As a direct consequence of 
the oversight and "inexcusable neglect" of Wendell and his 
counsel, defendants thus incurred significant legal expenses 
which, but for such oversight, would have been avoided. 
B* The "Inexcusable Neglect" of Plaintiff and/or his 
Attorney Justified the Court's Award of Attorneys Fees. 
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fees on any attorney who signs a pleading in violation of the 
rule, on the party who that attorney represents, or on both. 
See 2 A Moore's Federal Practice 1f 11. 01 [3], 
Even before the amendment to Federal Rule 11 sanctioning 
the award of attorneys fees under certain circumstances, 
however, federal courts had held that courts possess the 
inherent authority to assess attorneys fees in such 
circumstances. Id., 1f 11.01[4]. Courts specifically have the 
"inherent power," as part of their equitable jurisdiction, to 
"award attorneys fees when the interests of justice so 
require," Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); as, for example, 
when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously or 
for oppressive reasons," Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 
U.S. 752, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2464 (1980). A court's inherent 
authority includes the authority to impose attorneys fees on 
"errant lawyers" who practice before it, Loctite Corp. v. 
Fel-Pro, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 1, 11 (N.D. 111. 1980), and, 
specifically, on counsel guilty of "inexcusable neglect," 
Schwarz v. United States, 384 F.2d 833, 836 (2d Cir. 
1967)(attorneys fees to opposing party as an alternative to 
dismissal for failure to prosecute). State courts have the 
same heritage of equity jurisprudence and, hence, the same 
inherent authority. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, supra, 100 
S.Ct. at 2464 n. 13. 
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attorneys fees. The $5,000 awarded defendants closely 
corresponds to the fees incurred by defendants through the date 
that Wendell finally alerted defendants of his "error." 
R. 213, 216 paragraph 4. 
C. The Court was Not Required to Make Findings of Fact in 
Order to Sustain an Award of Attorneys Fees. 
Wendell also objects to the award of fees against him on 
the ground that the Court made no findings of fact concerning 
fees. Appellant's Brief, p. 1 ("Issue 4"), 23. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a), in effect in February and March 1986, 
when Judgment was entered, provided that "Findings of Fact 
. . . are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 
56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b)". Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a) (quoted portion of Rule repealed and amended 
effect. Jan. 1, 1987). Consequently, the Court was under no 
requirement to enter Findings of Fact with respect to the award 
of attorneys fees. 
Wendell cites Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 
1982) and F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 
404 P.2d 670 (1965) in support of his conclusion that Findings 
of Fact must be made in order for an award of attorneys fees to 
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evidence presented and weighed in that hearing (and as 
supplemented by the affidavit of defendants' attorney) was 
sufficient to support the court's award of attorneys fees. 
Barrett v. Melton, 112 Ariz. 605, 545 P.2d 421 (1976). The 
Court's award of attorney's fees to defendants, in short, is 
amply supported by the record and by evidence in the record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal because of Appellant's failure to timely file a 
Notice of Appeal, Consequently, this appeal should be 
dismissed and the summary judgment and award of attorneys fees 
in favor of Respondents affirmed. 
2. The alleged June 30, 1984 Will of Grant Taylor is 
invalid as a matter of law because it was not signed by the 
witnesses in the manner required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-502 
(1978). A doctrine of "substantial compliance" may not be 
wielded by Appellant to excise the last sentence of Section 
75-2-502. Furthermore, even if this Court were to embrace a 
doctrine of "substantial compliance," the plain requirements of 
Section 75-2-502 were not "substantially complied with" in this 
case. Summary judgment was therefore proper and should be 
affirmed. 
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CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
P. Bcyan F'isnburn 
Attoxneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS was mailed, postage fully 
prepaid this day of April, 1987, to the following: 
A. Howard Lundgren 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Judge Building 
No. 8 E. Broadway, Suite #313 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
P. B/yan ^ ishburn 
Attorney for Defendants 
Carol Metcalf 
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